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Response
Christina Szitta
Dr. Woo-Cumings provides a valuable picture of corporate governance in East Asia and embeds it in a rich historical and political
framework. The current crisis in East Asia can be viewed as a failure of
regulation, implying that we must carefully examine institutions and
the role of the state when considering the particulars of the situation.
She cautions us to examine and perhaps set aside our assumptions
about regulatory frameworks and proposals for reform that might well
be applicable to the U.S. economy but not necessarily to parts of East
Asia. Reforms can only be effective if they are specifically suited to the
contexts in which they must function.
The central unit of the Korean economy is the chaebol, which consists
of various subsidiaries, only a few of which need be profitable in order
to keep the chaebol afloat. Despite their negative aspects, chaebols have
played a major role in the breakneck rate of Korea’s growth over the
past few decades. Dr. Woo-Cumings states that the chaebol cannot and
should not be eliminated from the Korean economy.
An important feature of Dr. Woo-Cumings’s essay is her discussion
of the relationship between the chaebol and the government. When
Korea began its rapid industrialization, a dearth of accumulated capital meant that business had to rely on credit from banks. These banks
were controlled by and, until the 1980s, owned by the state. Businesses
were forced to maintain good relations with the government to avoid
the possibility of default on loans. The problem of corporate governance cannot be adequately addressed without examining the existence of corruption and the discretionary power of the politicians and
bureaucrats in Korea. These discretionary practices, as Dr. Woo-Cumings notes, “create the sense that the rules of the game in Korea are
endlessly negotiable.” The chaebol cannot continue to operate as they
have in the past. She stresses that there is no one-size-fits-all corporate
governance and that solutions cannot exist outside of the context of the
cultures within which those solutions must operate.
*****
Although I commend Dr. Woo-Cumings for her thorough examination
of the history and current cultural context of East Asian corporate gov186
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ernance, particularly the Korean chaebol, I believe there are several
issues critical to our discussion of the globalization of economic space
that she did not sufficiently address. My first point of concern is that
she does not describe how the chaebols and their participation in the
global market affect economic polarization within Korea, both in terms
of businesses and individuals. If these huge and generally familyowned conglomerates control a large fraction of economic activity,
what role is left for the small business owner or the budding entrepreneur? This is especially important in terms of innovation, which is the
engine of economic growth. Remember, many of today’s large firms
were, in the not-so-distant past, fledgling operations. The most obvious example is Microsoft.
Dr. Woo-Cumings notes that the state has tended to ignore the
property rights of its average citizens in favor of bailing out the big
firms. The economic system, with its emphasis on rapid growth, as
measured by GDP, has been geared toward protecting domestic producers at the expense of domestic consumers. Professor Byun Hyung
Yoon, once ostracized for his criticisms of the chaebol but currently
called on for his opinions on free-market practices, told the magazine
Far Eastern Economic Review: “Our policy-makers in the past were
obsessed by growth and efficiency at the expense of fair competition
and income. Now it’s time to consider equity as a central factor in our
economic development.”1 What possibilities exist to make equity, both
in terms of treating smaller firms fairly and not disadvantaging
domestic consumers, a more important goal, while maintaining the
chaebol system in some form?
My second contention is that we should be hesitant to look to the
Japanese model of corporate governance. It is certainly crucial to consider the history of the relationship between Japan and the other countries of East Asia, but the Japanese model, as we have seen in recent
years, is having its own difficulties adapting to globalization. In addition, the countries of East Asia are themselves so varied that some
argue we should not even discuss “one” Asian crisis because of the
diverse problems in the different countries. Today’s world changes so
swiftly that models from the past may not be appropriate for the
future. In addition, no single model can adequately address the economic difficulties faced by different countries. While the recent economic history of Japan is more applicable to Korea than, say, that of
the United States, Korea and the other East Asian economies should,
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while studying the past, also chart new courses in an uncertain but certainly changing future.
In the book The Commanding Heights, Daniel Yergin and Joseph
Stanislaw offer five “critical tests” that they believe will be used to
evaluate any model of corporate governance and economic reform.2
Their first question is: does it deliver the goods? Do the reforms serve
to improve the standard of living of individuals? Second: Do the new
practices ensure fairness in that success is widely distributed? Third:
Do the new practices uphold national identity? Fourth: Do they secure
the environment for current and future generations? And fifth: Can
they cope with demographic changes in the years to come? It would be
instructive to examine these questions when considering various
options, based upon past and current examples of corporate governance.
My third and primary concern is Dr. Woo-Cumings’s suggestion
that the history of past reform efforts should teach the Korean government to institute the rule of law — that is, to change the rules of the
game and then stick to them. Both corporations and the government
must be subject to the rule of law. In countries with histories of corruption in government, as well as arbitrary government involvement in
the regulation of corporations, this approach obviously would offer
certainty and stability. Under the rule of law, it would be easier to
attract and retain foreign investment because that investment would
appear more secure from the whims of the politicians.
But what exactly does the rule of law mean, particularly in countries
as diverse as those in East Asia? As Dr. Woo-Cumings says, these
countries have different political and cultural histories, and do not
have the same traditions that aided the development of the modern
capitalist society in other parts of the world. How can the rule of law
be implemented in such a way as to preserve some of the structures
that Dr. Woo-Cumings stresses are important parts of the culture, such
as the chaebol, while at the same time altering and improving upon
those structures so they are better able to function in a global marketplace? What formal rules will function with the existing and embedded informal rules? There are no easy answers to such questions.
Thomas Carothers wrote in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs: “Rule-oflaw reform will succeed only if it gets at the fundamental problem of
leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law.”3 The effective institution of
the rule of law demands “patient, sustained attention that will take
generations.”4
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*****
I would now like to place Dr. Woo-Cumings’s contributions into the
framework I use to consider questions of globalization and economic
space. As Adam Smith said, the test of any economic system needs to
be the welfare of its consumers. Using this as our guiding principle, we
must ask: What are our goals when discussing globalization? I contend
that government’s main goal should be to increase the standard of living of all its people. In this context, standard of living refers not to narrow, materialistic gain, but, rather, to an increase in human capacity, in
the ability of people to lead life as they choose. Consumers consume
not merely material goods, but also opportunities. How, I ask, can
Korea, or any nation, respond to or influence the forces of globalization while pursuing the goal of an improved standard of living?
Globalization, as Daniel Yergin points out, is both a condition and a
process.5 While discussing the process of globalization we must accept
that it already exists in some form. Shaping both of these discourses
are certain fundamental principles upon which economists’ assumptions about growth and development are based. The first fundamental
assumption is that truly free trade, because it takes advantage of the
gains from specialization, will bring an aggregate benefit to all parties
involved. One can disagree with this conclusion, but I hope we can
agree that trade barriers have lasting negative effects, particularly for
consumers. The second assumption is that competition is the vital
force that promotes efficiency. The “gales of creative destruction”
described by Joseph Schumpeter serve to ensure that producers meet
the needs of consumers to the best of their abilities. The third assumption is that interest rates, stock prices, and other such financial instruments should reflect the risk involved, which means they should not
be forcibly set by governments. While subject to criticism from many
perspectives, the practical application of these fundamental principles
has brought tremendous wealth to the industrialized world. The challenge now is for nations to apply these fundamentals so that the
nations themselves have more control over their economic and, hence,
their social, political, and cultural destinies. Economic growth provides greater means with which to create and institute change.
By emphasizing economic fundamentals, I do not wish to imply that
we should throw out all of our accumulated knowledge about market
inconsistencies and failures, pretend that the global playing field is
level, and declare all economic activity fair game for worldwide com-
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petition. However, risky loans and lower competitiveness leave countries vulnerable to the kinds of shocks and crises currently plaguing
East Asia. What works at one particular time, and for certain leaders,
in this ever-changing world economy may not work at the next point
in time.
What seems to remain, however, is the ability of these economic
fundamentals to create wealth, and the ability of strong institutions,
financial and otherwise, to deal with shocks more adequately than systems dominated by changing political interests. As Dr. Woo-Cumings
states: “The interventionist state in Korea has been profoundly ‘resultsoriented,’ privileging outcomes over established procedures and
rules.” While this may have produced the rapid growth of previous
decades, the current crisis has exposed to the world many flaws and
potential disasters that were shrouded during more prosperous times.
Because governments can come into and out of power so rapidly, particularly in times of economic hardship, rules that adhere to the economic fundamentals highlighted earlier must be established so they
become integral parts of the economic culture. And both corporations
and the government must abide by these rules.
Rules and reforms are most urgently needed in the financial sector.
Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank, says that the current crisis, which clearly exposes globalization’s double-edged sword
of opportunity and risk, “reinforces the belief that countries will benefit most from globalization when they have transparent, robust and
well-regulated financial markets.”6 In the wake of freely flowing capital, investors and borrowers alike seem to have forgotten that debt
implies risk and not cheap funds.7
According to Stiglitz, the financial sector will be strengthened by
making borrowers and lenders pay the full costs of their risks rather
than relying on government favors. This necessitates the establishment
of lending standards, methods of asset valuation, and disclosure and
accountability standards. It also means dealing with insolvent institutions without offering government bail-outs or loan guarantees. While
Stiglitz notes that the regulatory structures must be adapted to the specific situations and informal rules of different countries, he points out
there are certain fundamentals, such as greater transparency, that are
necessary if reforms are to be effective.
How will these reforms affect individuals and improve their condition? As Dr. Woo-Cumings observed, current policies in Korea favor
producers over consumers in numerous ways. Policies that do not
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shelter domestic industries from the forces of global competition will
allow consumers more say in how they want to improve their lives.
Along the same lines, policies must protect small investors. Some chaebols that have been newly exposed to competition have already taken
this into account. To paraphrase one chaebol executive, to emphasize
growth at the expense of other considerations often leads to stupid
investments.8 Stockholders and consumers play a valuable role in
developing strong institutions that are able to ride out the shocks of
the global economy.
Dr. Woo-Cumings emphasizes that Koreans will view the current
problem as the need to preserve and even nurture “the essential logic
of the chaebol.” I agree that the chaebol has contributed enormously to
the Korean economy, and I believe the best way to preserve and accentuate its value is to expose the chaebol to market forces and to eliminate
the political protections under which it has grown. Globalization
brings with it a necessity to accept market forces as a reality. Those
chaebols that have already initiated reforms have been exposed to very
strong competition and now realize that they “must restructure or perish.”9
*****
I would like to stress my agreement with Dr. Woo-Cumings on what I
believe is the crucial point to remember as we discuss these issues:
Because no specific model is “right,” we should not impose what has
worked in the past, in other countries, on those countries now experiencing hardships or those in the process of development. However,
when considering models appropriate to the current needs, certain
economic fundamentals are important. Strong institutions, however
they are built, that abide by these fundamentals allow for more autonomy, less exposure to shocks, and the ability to attract more (and more
stable) foreign capital, which can lead to growth. This growth, if stable
and lasting, can provide the means with which to address the concerns
of those most vulnerable to the globalization of economic space.
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